Introduction
The recent fi nancial crisis has shown that liquidity risk plays an important role in the contemporary fi nancial system. This is especially true for economies that are traditionally based on banks and credit markets. A liquidity shock may propagate through a real channel or an information channel and then affect the entire fi nancial system (Frait & Komárková, 2011) . As a systemic banking crisis can have costly consequences such as declines in gross domestic product growth, real house prices and real equity prices and increases in unemployment rate, real public debt, among other effects (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009) , it is not surprising that most regulators, policymakers and academics devote signifi cant attention to various aspects of liquidity risk measurement and management. National regulators monitor the level of bank liquidity in individual banking sectors. New legislative rules concerning bank liquidity were issued in December 2010. One component of the Basel III rules strengthens liquidity risk regulation by imposing minimum liquidity standards (Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Net Stable Funding Ratio) and implementing monitoring tools to assess liquidity risk (BIS, 2010) .
There are also numerous empirical studies focusing on the risk of contagion through the interbank market (e.g., Allen & Gale, 2000; Blavarg & Nimander, 2002; Memmel & Sachs, 2013; or Wells, 2004) , on the determinants of bank liquidity risk (such as Aspachs et al., 2005; Bunda & Desquilbet, 2008; Dinger, 2009; Lucchetta, 2007; Moore, 2010; or Rauch et al., 2010) or on the sensitivity of banks to various liquidity shocks (e.g., Boss et al., 2007; Negrila, 2010;  or Van den End, 2008) . However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical study focusing on the determinants of bank vulnerability to a bank run. This paper therefore attempts to fi ll this gap.
There are several reasons that we focus on the Visegrad countries (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). First, the national fi nancial systems can be characterized as bank-oriented and concentrated on a model of universal banking. Banks have a dominant role in fi nancial intermediation and banks are also important for the whole economies of these countries. One can illustrate this on the indicator of total banking assets over GDP. The values from 2015 show 127% in Czechia, 113% in Hungary, 85% in Poland and Slovakia.
Second, banking sectors in the Visegrad (hereafter V4) countries are dominated by foreign banks and fi nancial conglomerates that are often present and systematically important in many countries. Therefore, fi nancial stability of these banking sectors and their ability to withstand sudden deposit withdrawal can be affected also by strategies implemented by multinational fi nancial conglomerates and by the fi nancial stability and credibility of both the parent company and its subsidiaries.
Third, due to aforementioned characteristics the banking sectors in the V4 countries are suffi ciently homogeneous for application of identical methodology and variables. On the other hand, they slightly differ in structure and macroeconomic conditions. Hence, we meet the requirements for an insightful cross-country comparison and can expect some differences in explaining vulnerability of banks to a potential bank run.
Fourth, we are convinced that the risk of bank run in the V4 countries is not only theoretical and imaginary eventuality but deserves a serious research interest. Our view is also supported by recent evidence. Besides the well-known examples of bank runs in developed countries such as Northern Rock
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Finance in the UK, IndyMac and Wachowia in the US or DSB Bank in the Netherlands bank runs occurred also in central and Eastern Europe. The most recent episodes can be found in Bulgaria (Corporate Commercial Bank and First Investment Bank in June 2014) and in Poland (SK Bank in December 2015) .
Therefore, the aim of the paper is to examine potential bank runs in the V4 countries. In particular, we determine maximum volume of deposits that can be withdrawn from each individual bank and identify the determinants of banks' sensitivity to a bank run. The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides theoretical background on bank liquidity and bank runs. Then, we focus on the methodology, data and results of the analysis. The fi nal section offers concluding remarks.
Bank Liquidity and Bank Runs
Each bank has to be liquid, which means that it should have suffi cient fi nancial resources to meet its obligations as they fall due or be able to obtain such funds at reasonable costs. Insuffi cient bank liquidity may lead to a situation in which the majority of depositors intend to withdraw their funds, which will in turn result in a run on the bank.
Banks have been always plagued by the problem of bank runs. Freixas and Rochet (1997) defi ne a bank run as a situation wherein depositors observe large withdrawals from their bank, fear bankruptcy and respond by withdrawing their own deposits. Banks are vulnerable to runs, which can lead to closure and liquidation because they issue liquid liabilities in the form of deposit contracts but invest in illiquid assets in the form of loans. A banking panic then occurs when depositors at many or all of the banks in a region or a country attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously (Allen & Gale, 1998) .
The theoretical literature on bank runs is primarily based on the study of Bryant (1980) and the model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) that accentuate the fact that bank runs are selffulfi lling prophecies. Two types of bank runs can be distinguished: effi cient and ineffi cient. Given the assumption that the liquidation of some assets is costly, there are multiple equilibriums. If depositors believe that a banking panic will occur, it is optimal for each depositor to attempt to withdraw his funds. The bank will then have to liquidate some of its assets at a loss. Those depositors who withdraw initially will receive more than those who wait (given the assumption of fi rst-come, fi rst-served). Anticipating this, all depositors have an incentive to withdraw immediately. Such a situation may be called an ineffi cient bank run. Conversely, all agents withdraw their funds according to their consumption needs if no depositors believe that a panic will occur (and another equilibrium exists).
An effi cient bank run is based on fundamental factors. Depositors who have information concerning an impending downturn in the business cycle may anticipate fi nancial diffi culties in the banking sector and attempt to withdraw their funds. Such behavior will precipitate the crisis (Allen & Gale, 1998) .
As bank runs are typically considered costly and adverse events for the banking sector and the whole economy, most economists and, particularly, regulators attempt to determine the best ways to prevent bank runs. One possibility is to establish a functional deposit insurance scheme. A major argument in favor of deposit insurance is that it maintains and promotes fi nancial stability by preventing ineffi cient bank runs arising from asymmetric information and self-fulfi lling prophecies (as in Diamond & Dybvig, 1983) . On the other hand, many studies indicate that deposit insurance fails to maintain banking stability because of moral hazard.
To a certain extent, effi cient liquidity risk management can also prevent bank runs. A suffi cient level of bank liquidity in the form of liquidity buffers can prevent panic sales of assets when banks face pressure caused by their need to cover investors' request to withdraw deposits or by investors' unwillingness to roll over short-term bonds issued by banks. Such buffers enhance the ability of banks to absorb external shocks (Frait & Komárková, 2011) . Fund-raising options also include strategies involving the interbank market (where banks can borrow from other banks in response to liquidity demand) and the option of relying on emergency liquidity assistance from a lender of last resort (Aspachs et al., 2005) .
Therefore, in accordance with the recommendation of the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, fi nancial institutions should gauge their potential vulnerability to such events by conducting of stress tests (BIS, 2000) . Such stress testing would enable us to determine the worst-case scenario for each 3, XX, 2017 Finance bank in the banking sectors of the V4 countries and to investigate which factors affect the sensitivity of individual banks to a bank run.
Methodology and Data
First, we will evaluate the level of liquidity risk for each bank in the sample using the most commonly employed liquidity ratio, the liquid asset ratio. The liquid asset ratio (LAR) is the share of liquid assets in total assets (Equation 1).
 
This ratio should give us information on a bank's capacity to absorb a general liquidity shock. As a general rule, the higher the ratio, the higher the capacity to absorb liquidity shock is, provided that market liquidity is the same for all banks in the sample. We use the BankScope measure of liquid assets which includes cash, government bonds, short-term claims on other banks (including certifi cates of deposit), and where appropriate the trading portfolio.
As a next step, we will simulate a run on a bank by the withdrawal of a certain volume of clients' deposits. There are studies that focus on modeling bank runs in the Czech ), Slovak (Jurča & Rychtárik, 2006 , Romanian (Negrila, 2010) , Austrian (Boss et al., 2004 and 2007) and Luxembourg (Rychtárik, 2009) Next, we will compare this stress value of the liquid asset ratio (LAR S ) to the baseline value of this ratio (LAR B , i.e., LAR). The percentage change of the ratio LAR between its stress and baseline values will be calculated according to Equation 3. The results will reveal the magnitude of the relative changes between the stress and baseline values, which will enable us to determine which bank is the most vulnerable.
Since the values of LAR S are obviously always less than the values of LAR B , we will quantify the extent of the percentage change in positive numbers. We will also be able to determine the worst-case scenario for each bank in the sample, i.e. the maximum volume of deposits that can be withdrawn from the bank.
Finally, to identify determinants that affect the worst-case scenario for banks in the V4 countries, we will use panel data regression analysis (Equation 4). (4) where ΔD it is the maximum possible deposit withdrawal for bank i at time t (expressed as a percentage of deposits of bank i at time t), X it is vector of explanatory variables for bank i at time t, α is a constant, β' is a row vector of coeffi cient
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Finance that represents the slope of explanatory variables, δ i represents fi xed effects for bank i, and ε i is the error term. The maximum deposit withdrawal refers to the situation in which the stressed value of LAR is equal to zero i.e. LAR S = 0. This is related to the situation when the numerator of Equation 2 is equal to zero, i.e. when the maximum deposit withdrawal is equal to the available liquid assets of the bank. The panel regression is applied in order to involve the whole national banking sector into one model. Although we work with bank-level data the banks perform under common regulation and supervision framework and face the same macroeconomic conditions.
It is evident that the most crucial task is to determine the appropriate explanatory variables. Although the liquidity problems of certain banks during the global fi nancial crisis re-emphasized that liquidity is very important for the functioning of fi nancial markets and the banking sector, an important gap nevertheless exists in the empirical literature on liquidity and its measurement. This is especially true for the determinants of bank sensitivity to any stress scenario; to the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical study focusing on the determinants of bank vulnerability to a bank run. Therefore, in our literature review, we will focus on empirical studies that sought to identify the determinants of selected liquidity ratio. Studies have reported that some determinants have positive effects in some countries but negative effects in others. In essence, the potential determinants of bank liquidity can be divided into two groups: macroeconomic and bank-specifi c variables.
Many studies have tested the impact of gross domestic product (GDP) on bank liquidity. This impact may be either positive (such as in Fielding & Shortland, 2005; Vodová 2013; , which signals that a cyclical downturn should reduce banks' expected transaction demand for money and therefore lead to decreased liquidity, or negative, which means that banks hold a smaller amount of liquidity in periods of stronger economic growth (as demonstrated by Aspachs et al., 2005; Dinger 2009; Grant, 2012; Moore, 2010; Rauch et al., 2010; Vodová, 2013) .
Another macroeconomic variable, the unemployment rate, is connected with the demand for loans and typically acts as a proxy for the general health of the economy. However, its impact on bank liquidity is again mixedpositive according to Munteanu (2012) and Vodová (2013) and negative as in Munteanu (2012); Rauch et al. (2010); Vodová (2013; . The negative impact of unemployment has more of economic rationality as it is in accordance with the fact that banks suffer from a reduction in solvency and create lower liquidity in troubled economic times. The positive impact can be particularly revealed in times of economic stability and relatively stable unemployment rate.
The levels of various types of interest rates also appear to be important: the monetary policy interest rate, money market interest rate, interbank interest rate and lending interest rate. Again, in some countries, the effect of the interest rate on bank liquidity is positive (e.g., Agénor et al., 2000; Bunda & Desquilbet, 2008; Dinger, 2009; Fielding & Shortland, 2005; Lucchetta, 2007; Moore, 2010; Munteanu, 2012; Vodová, 2013; , while in other countries or periods, the interest rate adversely affects bank liquidity (see Aspachs et al., 2005; Bunda & Desquilbet, 2008; Grant, 2012; Lucchetta, 2007; Moore, 2010; Munteanu, 2012; Rauch et al., 2010; or Vodová, 2013 and . The same, e.g., mixed results, can also be observed for the interest margin -a negative impact in Aspachs et al. (2005) or Grant (2012) ; while a positive link is reported by Vodová (2015) . A positive relationship between interest rates and bank liquidity is connected with the problem of credit rationing, while a negative link indicates that if lending activity is more profi table, banks will hold a smaller buffer of liquid assets and prefer to provide loans.
Recent studies have also focused on the impact of the fi nancial crisis on bank liquidity, which may be again either negative (such as in Bunda & Desquilbet, 2008; Moore, 2010; Vodová, 2013 and or positive (as it was demonstrated by Berrospide, 2013; Cornet et al., 2012; Moore, 2010) . The negative link between the fi nancial crisis and bank liquidity is obvious: a fi nancial crisis can be the result of poor bank liquidity; poor bank liquidity can also be a result of a fi nancial crisis. However, a positive relationship between the crisis and bank liquidity can also be explained: during the crisis, banks devoted greater attention to cautious liquidity risk management and held higher buffers of liquid assets. Thus, during a crisis, bank liquidity may even increase. Such behavior may also be associated with 3, XX, 2017 Finance liquidity hoarding (Acharya & Merrouche, 2013; Berrospide, 2013; Kapadia et al., 2012) .
Among other macroeconomic factors, the type of exchange rate regime is an important consideration. According to Bunda and Desquilbet (2008) , in extreme regimes such as pure fl oating and currency board and dollarized economies, banks are more liquid than in intermediate regimes. Additional relevant factors are the share of public expenditures in GDP (which Bunda & Desquilbet, 2008 , demonstrated to have a positive effect on bank liquidity); the volatility of the cash to deposit ratio (where higher volatility increases bank liquidity according to Agénor et al., 2000) ; and the probability of obtaining support from a lender of last resort in the event of a liquidity shortage (which reduces incentives to hold liquid assets as demonstrated by Aspachs et al., 2005) . Fielding and Shortland (2005) also demonstrated that banks hold excessive liquid reserves in periods of political instability.
Although banks within a given country face to the same macroeconomic conditions, their liquidity levels differ. The reason lies in different bank-specifi c conditions. Many bank-specifi c variables such as the size of the bank, its capital adequacy and profi tability, and the quality of its loan portfolio, have been analyzed in individual studies.
Two different theories explain the link between capital adequacy and bank liquidity (Berger & Bouwman, 2009 ). The fi nancial fragility-crowding-out hypothesis suggests that bank capital may impede liquidity creation by making the bank's capital structure less fragile. A fragile capital structure encourages the bank to commit to monitoring its borrowers, and, hence, allows it to extend loans. Additional equity capital makes it more diffi cult for less fragile banks to commit to monitoring, which in turn hampers the bank's ability to create liquidity. Capital may also reduce liquidity creation because it crowds out deposits. This negative relationship between bank liquidity and capital adequacy has been reported by Berger and Bouwman (2009) , Diamond and Rajan (2001) , Dinger (2009), Distinguin et al. (2013) , Gorton and Winton (2000) , Lei and Song (2013) , Munteanu (2012) , and Vodová (2013 and . An alternative view -the risk absorption hypothesis -is related to banks' role as risk transformers and emphasizes that higher capital improves banks' ability to absorb risk and hence their ability to create liquidity. This theory has been confi rmed by Berger and Bouwman (2009), Berrospide (2013) , and Vodová (2013; .
Banks that are net lenders on the interbank market tend to be smaller than borrower banks (Lucchetta, 2007) . Most studies agree that the size of banks is negatively correlated with their liquidity. Large banks are less willing to hold liquid assets because they rely more on funds from the interbank market (Berrospide, 2013; Cornet et al., 2012; Dinger, 2009; Vodová, 2013) .
The quality of a bank's credit portfolio is also relevant: with a higher share of nonperforming loans, banks begin to offset higher credit risk with more cautious liquidity risk management (Vodová, 2013; . Moreover, greater portion of nonperforming loans in portfolio has a negative impact on bank's profi tability. The link between bank profi tability and liquidity may, again, be either negative (such as in Grant, 2012 or Vodová, 2013 or positive (Vodová, 2013) . Bank profi tability having a negative infl uence on liquidity is consistent the standard fi nance theory, which emphasizes the negative correlation between liquidity and profi tability. Bank profi tability may be indicative of strategy whereby liquidity-constrained banks need to accumulate profi ts that can then be invested in liquid assets and thus used as a source of liquidity.
The selection of explanatory variables is based on the studies cited above. We considered whether the use of a particular variable is economically reasonable in case of the V4 countries. We also considered which other factors could infl uence the sensitivity of banks to a bank run.
We can expect that the most vulnerable banks should be those with an insuffi cient amount of client deposits to fi nance their activities. Therefore, they need to use other sources of funding. This assumption is refl ected in application of the loan-to-deposit and netinterbank-position ratios. LODE measures the structural mismatch between borrowing and lending to/from customers. Banks that show large funding gap (very high LODE) are more exposed to liquidity risk. Vulnerable banks should also focus more on providing loans to non-bank customers; therefore, they have a smaller buffer of liquid assets. Bank liquidity and profi tability are closely linked. If banks Finance seek only to achieve maximum profi tability, they provide relatively more loans to nonbank customers and use more funds from the interbank market to fi nance their activities, which makes them considerably more vulnerable in the event of a crisis (which can be accompanied by, e.g., a bank run). Conversely, the safest strategy is to hold a suffi cient buffer of liquid assets (i.e., to have high value for the LAR ratio), to provide loans to non-bank customers on a rational basis and to fi nance lending activity mainly from client deposits. These ideas, together with the fi ndings of studies focusing on the determinants of liquidity ratios, are refl ected in the list of variables employed in this study (Tab. 1).
We considered seven bank-specifi c factors and seven macroeconomic factors. We do not have exact expectations concerning the impact of these factors on a bank's sensitivity to a bank run, as this is the fi rst study to investigate this problem. The macroeconomic data were provided by the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Central Bank (ECB), Czech National Bank (CNB), National Bank of Poland (NBP), Hungarian National Bank (MNB) and National Bank of Slovakia (NBS). The bank specifi c data were obtained from the unconsolidated balance sheet and profi t and loss data recorded in the BankScope database.
We used data over the period 2000-2014. Tab. 2 provides additional details on the sample. Despite the relatively small number of banks in the sample, the data set includes signifi cant parts of all banking sectors (usually more than 70% of total assets of the banking sector). Due to the homogeneity of the data set, we include only data from commercial banks. We exclude branches of foreign banks, mortgage banks, building societies and state banks with special purposes (such as Českomoravská záruční a rozvojová banka, Slovenská záručná a rozvojová banka, Česká exportní banka, Exim banka, Magyar Fejlesztési Bank or Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego). The national panels Finance are unbalanced because some banks do not report or exist over the full period of analysis.
Results and Discussion
The fi rst part of this section presents the median values of the baseline and the stress values of the liquid asset ratio and the worstcase scenario (bank run) for each bank in the sample. The second part of this section focuses on factors that determine vulnerability of banks to the bank run.
Scenario Analysis
The median values of the baseline and stress values of the share of liquid assets in total assets (LAR) are presented in Fig. 1 . As a higher value of this ratio means higher liquidity, it is evident that bank liquidity in all V4 countries decrease during the analyzed period. However, the trends differ between countries. The liquidity of Czech banks declined during the period 2000-2007, due to the mutual effect of higher lending activity by Czech banks and the decrease of balances with central banks and other banks (CNB, 2008) . After a slight improvement in liquidity during 2008-2011, liquidity subsequently decreased in recent years. As the largest share of liquid assets in the Czech banking sector consists of government securities, it is evident that the development of liquid assets as a whole is strongly infl uenced by their volume held by banks (CNB, 2012; 2014) . When it comes to the Hungarian banking sector, it was affected by the fi nancial crisis already in 2007. According to HFSA (2009) , the internal, structural features of the banking sector have evolved over the years. These specifi cs area very high loan-to-deposit ratio, long net foreign currency position which resulted from the growing ratio of foreign currency loans (about one third of loans to non-fi nancial companies and even two thirds of loans to households). Moreover, some Hungarian banks provided loans to foreign customers especially from CEE countries which were fi nanced partly by local retail deposits. These structural weaknesses gained special importance due to the worsening fi nancial and economic conditions.
The situation was very similar in the Polish banking sector. The liquid asset ratio fl uctuated Moreover, activities in the interbank market changed dramatically. While Slovak banks had mostly received deposits from foreign banks and then conducted sterilization operations with the National Bank of Slovakia in previous years, after the euro changeover, these operations lost their former signifi cance. Most banks borrowed funds from other banks with the Eurosystem and predominantly invested these funds in government bonds and, in some cases, in the interbank market, mainly in transactions with parent banks (NBS, 2010) . After a further decline in bank liquidity, we observe slight improvements in 2014.
A lower stressed value for the liquid asset is a clear signal of a liquidity outfl ow. Median values of the stressed liquid asset ratio for Czech banks are positive for the full period. This means that Czech banking sector as a whole should be well prepared for a bank run, simulated by a withdrawal of 20% of client deposits. Of course, individual banks in individual years could have problems coping with such a crisis; noteworthy in this regard are Equa bank in 2011-2014, Česká spořitelna in 2006 -2008 and 2014 , ČSOB in 2006 -2008 , GE Money Bank in 2007 , J&T banka and Expobanka in 2012 -2014 , or Raiffeisenbank in 2010 -2013 . Also Hungarian banking sector seems to be quite resilient which is refl ected in the positive median values of the stressed liquid asset ratio. Only a few banks would not be able to face such development, e.g. Budapest Bank, CIB Bank, Raiffeisen Bank, Sopron Bank Burgenland and Credigen bank.
However, in the case of Slovakia and Poland, the situation would be considerably Started in 2010, Polish banking sector as a whole would not be able to withstand the withdrawal of 20% of client deposits, with the exception of Raiffeisen Bank Polska, BPH Bank, Nordea Bank, Bank Polskiej Spoldzielczosci, SGB Bank and Mercedes-Benz Bank.
Regarding the average impact of a bank run on the liquid asset ratio, we observe a gradually rising negative effect of the simulated bank run on the liquidity of banks over the entire analyzed period (see Tab. 3 for average values). It is evident that the fi nancial crisis increased the sensitivity of all banks to a possible bank run. However, it is surprising that banks in three V4 countries would have been the most vulnerable only recently. In particular, Czech banks in 2012 and Slovak and Polish banks in 2013. It seems that with the exception of Hungary, there is a signifi cant time lag between the emergence of the fi nancial crisis and its impacts on liquidity of banks. We can also see that the impact of the crisis on banks differs among analyzed countries.
Our aim is also to determine the maximum volume of deposits that can be withdrawn from individual banks, i.e., to identify the worst-case scenario for each bank. If customers sought to further withdraw their deposits, the existence of these banks would be in jeopardy because of insuffi cient liquidity. The depositors of Slovak Tatra banka or Polish Getin Noble would be able to withdraw only 1% of their deposits or even less in some years which is particularly alarming. Conversely, at least in some years, the depositors of certain other banks would be able to withdraw more than 50% of their deposits.
Panel Data Regression Analysis
To identify the factors that determine the sensitivity of banks to a bank run, we employ an econometric package EViews 9. After tests of stationarity, normality and multicollinearity, we proceed with regression estimation. We estimated Equation 4. First we included all explanatory variables that might have an effect on the dependent variable (all explanatory variables considered in the analysis are those which are presented in Tab. 1).
Some bank-specifi c variables as well as some macroeconomic factors could infl uence ability of banks to withstand sudden deposit withdrawal also with a certain time lag. For example, the deterioration in overall economic development probably does not increase bank vulnerability immediately, because the bank has suffi cient volume of liquid assets and its fi nancial situation is stable. More likely, the buffer of liquid assets is gradually decreasing due to worsening economic conditions. The bank which was initially liquid may gradually become illiquid. Likewise, the worsening quality of loan portfolio usually is manageable in shortterm. The vulnerability of bank increases if troubles with repaying the loans continues and escalates. The effect of profi tability can also be more pronounced with some delay as actual profi ts generated by illiquid assets will affect the future liquidity risk of the bank. Therefore, in economically rational cases we experimented with lagged variables in model estimations. The lags were used for the following variables CAP, NPL, ROA, GDP, UNE. The maximum time lag was set to two years for GDP growth rate and one year for remaining lagged variables. Similar approach to application of lagged variables can be found in e.g. Berrospide (2013), Vodová (2013) or Adusei (2015) .
To reduce the number of explanatory variables, we used information criteria (Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn). Our aim was to fi nd a regression model with a high value of the adjusted coeffi cient of determination in which all the variables involved are statistically signifi cant. The results for Czech banks are recorded in Tab. 5.
The explanatory power of the model is quite high. The sensitivity of Czech banks to the possible bank run, or, more preciously, the maximum deposit withdrawal for individual Czech banks, is determined primarily by two bank-specifi c and two macroeconomic factors.
Focusing on bank-specifi c factors, the bank's profi tability and liquidity are important. The share of loans to deposits (LODE) is an indirect measure of bank liquidity. This ratio relates illiquid assets to liquid liabilities. The higher this ratio, the less liquid the bank is. The negative sign of the regression coeffi cient is consistent with the fact that the lower the value of the LODE ratio (and thus the higher the bank liquidity), the greater the deposit withdrawal the bank is able to withstand.
The positive link between bank profi tability measured by return on assets (ROA) and the ability of the bank to face a bank run may be 3, XX, 2017 Finance somewhat surprising. However, profi tability is one of the key factors of a bank's fi nancial stability. This variable is lagged by two years, which means that banks that were fi nancially stable in the past are much safer even in the event of a sudden deposit withdrawal.
Among the macroeconomic factors, two variables are statistically signifi cant: the interest rate on loans (IRL) and unemployment rate (UNE). The interest rate on loans is likely connected with bank profi tability. With a higher interest rate on loans, a bank's lending becomes more profi table. Furthermore, with higher accumulated profi t, the bank is better able to withstand the emergency of a crisis.
The unemployment rate is the last statistically signifi cant variable. Given an increase in the unemployment rate in the previous year, bank customers are able to withdraw a smaller portion of their deposits. This variable can act as a proxy for the general health of the economy. Therefore, with an increase in the unemployment rate (and given past deterioration of macroeconomic conditions) means that banks are more vulnerable to possible bank runs.
Determinants of the maximum deposit withdrawals for Hungarian banks are presented in Tab. 6. Four variables are statistically signifi cant: size of the bank, loan-to-deposit ratio, share of net interbank position in total assets and the unemployment rate. The explanatory power is slightly higher than for the Czech banking sector.
Two variables are the same as for Czech banks: loan-to-deposit ratio (LODE) and the unemployment rate (UNE). The share of net interbank position in total assets (NITA) refl ects the fact if the bank is a net lender or a net borrower on the interbank market. The positive sign of the regression coeffi cient signals that net lenders are safer in case of sudden deposit withdrawal. It is obvious as the net lenders operate with abundance of clients' deposits and loans provided on the interbank market usually represent liquid assets.
Size of the bank (TOA) also matters in the Hungarian banking sector. Large banks are less vulnerable to a potential bank run than small banks. This fi nding is in accordance with Berger and Bouwman (2009) and stems from the fact that large banks in general have more established position on the interbank market and, therefore, better access to funds from this market. Moreover, large banks can use a wider range of sources of funding than small banks. For example, large banks are usually affi liated with a fi nancial conglomerate and, thus, intragroup fund transfers are possible and available.
The ability of Polish banks to withstand the deposit withdrawal is determined mainly by their capital adequacy (CAP), position on the interbank market (NITA), the way how they fi nance their lending activity (LODE) and the general economic conditions (expressed e.g. by the rate of unemployment -UNE). The results are recorded in Tab. 7.
Two bank-specifi c variables (NITA and LODE) and one macroeconomic factor (UNE) have the same impact on the vulnerability of banks as it was explained above for Czech and Hungarian banks. The last statistically signifi cant 
Tab. 5: Factors Affecting the Sensitivity Banks to a Bank Run in Czechia
Finance variable is capital adequacy. Looking on previous research on liquidity of Polish banks, its negative infl uence is not a surprising fi nding. According to Vodová (2013) , bank liquidity decreases with capital adequacy of the bank. This link between capital adequacy and bank liquidity shows that banks offset lower capital adequacy with more cautious liquidity risk management and hold suffi cient buffer of liquid assets. More liquid banks are able to repay the higher share of deposits to their depositors if needed. The estimated coeffi cients that best fi t the regression model for Slovak banks are presented in Tab. 8. Two bank-specifi c and two macroeconomic factors are important for bank sensitivity to a bank run.
As in the case of Czech banks, profi tability and lending activity are also signifi cant for Slovak banks. However, regarding bank profi tability, the opposite relationship is observed. The negative infl uence of bank profi tability (ROA) is consistent with standard fi nance theory which emphasizes the negative correlation between liquidity and profi tability. It should be noted that ROA is lagged by one year in the model. This means that banks that earned less profi t in the previous year pay much more attention to liquidity risk management, which in turn refl ects in their greater capacity to withstand a possible bank run. Such banks are able to repay a higher percentage of their clients' deposits. 
Finance
It is not surprising that the second bankspecifi c factor, again, accounts only for the liquidity of the bank. The share of loans in total assets (LOTA) indicates what percentage of the bank's assets are tied up in illiquid loans; therefore, the higher this ratio, the less liquid the bank is. The sign of the estimated coeffi cient is negative, which is logical. Banks with a lower value of LOTA (i.e., banks with lower lending activity with non-bank clients) focus more on other types of banking business such as interbank loans or trading in securities. Both types of transactions increase the volume of liquid assets, which makes the bank less vulnerable to possible unforeseen deposit withdrawals.
Among the macroeconomic variables considered, the interest rate on interbank transactions (IRB) and the unemployment rate (UNE) are statistically signifi cant. The interbank interest rate can be perceived as the price of liquidity obtained on the interbank market. An increase in this price is a clear incentive to provide more interbank loans because a higher interbank interest rate makes these transactions more profi table. As interbank loans are a part of a bank's liquid assets, the bank's ability to withstand deposit withdrawal increases with larger volume of the disbursed interbank loans. This conclusion fully corresponds with the infl uence of the lending activity of a bank.
The impact of the unemployment rate on the ability of the bank to survive a bank run is the same as for all other V4 countries, only without any time lag. Under worsening macroeconomic conditions, banks are able to fi nance lower amounts of deposit withdrawals.
We can compare our results only with the fi ndings of Vodová (2013) , who analyzed the determinants of the liquid asset ratio in the V4 countries for the period from 2000 to 2011. Regarding Czech, Hungarian and Polish banks, the determinants of the holding of liquid assets are completely different from the factors that infl uence the sensitivity of banks to a potential bank run. For Slovak banks, the holding of liquid assets increased as the interest rate on loans increased and decreased as profi tability, the unemployment rate and the capital adequacy of the bank increased. As we can see, two factors that infl uenced the level of bank liquidity measured by liquid asset ratio are also relevant to the sensitivity of banks to a possible bank run: bank profi tability and the unemployment rate. Two other factors are different. However, both of them have some connection with bank liquidity. This confi rms that the ability of banks to withstand an unforeseen deposit withdrawal is substantially determined by the level of bank liquidity. Banks that have a suffi cient buffer of liquid assets are safer than other banks, particularly during periods of fi nancial distress.
Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to determine maximum volume of deposits that can be withdrawn from banks in the V4 countries and identify the determinants of banks' sensitivity to a bank run. The analysis was performed over the period 2000-2014. Note: The starred coeffi cient estimates are signifi cant at the 1% (*), 5% (**) or 10% (***) level.
Tab. 8: Factors Affecting the Sensitivity of Banks to a Bank Run in Slovakia
Bank liquidity, measured by the liquid asset ratio, decreased in all countries during the analyzed period. However, the rate of change of the LAR indicator differs across the V4 banking sectors. While the change in Hungary was only -10.5% (decrease of the median value from 33% in 2000 to 34% in 2014), the LAR in Slovakia dropped by 75% (decrease from 32% in 2000 to just 8% in 2014). The change in liquidity of the Czech banks was -61% (decrease from 41% in 2000 to 16% in 2014) and the change in Poland amounted to -65.4% (decrease from 26% to 9%). Moreover, we identifi ed two peculiar trends in the liquidity development. A distinct trend of the LAR deterioration can be observed between 2000 and 2009. Although some fl uctuations and reversals temporarily occurred the general trend was followed in all V4 countries. Especially in Hungary and Poland, some important structural weaknesses arose during that time. In particular, a very high loan-to-deposit ratio, a high share of foreign debts, and a negative net position in the interbank market. By contrast, substantially different development of the LAR indicator can be discovered during the post-crisis period. While the median value of LAR stagnated in Czechia and Poland, the trend of deterioration continued in Slovakia. The only banking sector that showed an increase of liquidity was in Hungary.
Stress values of the liquid asset ratio indicated that although Czech and Hungarian banks have, on average, been well prepared for a potential bank run, Slovak and Polish banks have not, on average, been able to withstand a 20% withdrawal of client deposits since 2009, respectively 2010. In all countries, the impact of this stress scenario increased during analyzed period. The ability of individual banks to survive an unforeseen deposit withdrawal differs signifi cantly. However, Czech and Hungarian banks are, on average, able to withstand larger deposit withdrawals than are Slovak and Polish banks.
The results of the panel data regression analysis showed that the sensitivity of commercial banks from the V4 countries to a possible bank run, or more preciously, the maximum deposit withdrawal for individual banks, is determined primarily by bank liquidity (connected with lending activity, the way of its fi nancing and activity of the bank on the interbank market) and its profi tability (for Czech and Slovak banks) and capital adequacy (for Polish banks), the size of the bank (for Hungarian banks), the interest rate (on loans for Czech banks and on interbank transaction for Slovak banks), and the unemployment rate. Although the signs, magnitudes and lags are not perfectly consistent in all V4 countries we can conclude that the banks with suffi cient buffer of liquid assets operating with higher profi tability and capital adequacy in environment of higher interest rates and lower unemployment are able to withstand the largest unforeseen withdrawal and most successfully face a bank run. Such characteristics naturally proved to be even more important during periods of fi nancial distress.
There are many ways which may improve the research about determinants of banks' sensitivity to a bank run in the future. First, we can simply extend the time series and divide the analysis into pre-crisis, crisis and postcrisis periods. Another possibility is to extend the research into other banking sectors, e.g. to include other central and eastern European countries. It would be also possible to include other variables which may have effect on banks' sensitivity to a bank run. 
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